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QUESTION PRESENTED
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. E.E.O.C., this Court "express[ed] no view on
whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types of
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach
of contract or tortious conduct by their religious em-
ployers. There will be time enough to address the ap-
plicability of the exception to other circumstances if
and when they arise." 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
The time has come for this Court to clarify that,
consistent with this Court’s other First Amendment
precedents, the ministerial exception does not abso-
lutely protect breach of contract and tortious conduct.
The question presented is:
Whether the ministerial exception of the First
Amendment absolutely bars breach of con-
tract and tortious conduct lawsuits in situa-
tions of illegal conduct or harm to third
parties.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The following party was a plaintiff below and is
Petitioner here: Edwin R. Melhorn.
Cedar Grove United Methodist Church, the
Baltimore-Washington Conference of the United Meth-
odist Church, and Rev. Karin Walker were defendants
below and are the Respondents here.
ooo
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1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Edwin R. Melhorn respectfully petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Maryland
Court of Appeals.
OPINIONS BELOW
The May 23, 2016, Court of Appeals of Maryland’s
order denying certiorari is unpublished. Certiorari Pe-
tition Appendix [Pet. App.] 30; Melhorn v. Baltimore-
Washington Conference of United Methodist Church,
No. 2065, Sept. Term 2014, 2016 WL 1065884 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Mar. 16, 2016), cert. denied sub nom.
Melhorn v. Baltimore-Washington Conference, 136 A.3d
817 (Md. 2016). The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land’s opinion and dismissal of all claims on Mar. 16,
2016, is unreported. Pet. App. 1-15. The Circuit Court
of Maryland for Baltimore County’s order of final judg-
ment dated Nov. 6, 2014, is unpublished. Pet. App. 16-
17. The Circuit Court’s order referenced its reasons
stated on the record in open court. The transcript of the
relevant record in open court is reprinted at Pet. App.
18-29.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland af-
firmed dismissal of Petitioner Melhorn’s claims in its
decision filed Mar. 16, 2016, Pet. App. 1, and the order
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland denying review
2was entered on May 23, 2016, Pet. App. 30. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This petition involves the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which state:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Edwin Melhorn worked at the International Busi-
ness Machines Corporation ("IBM") for nearly twenty-
five years as a financial manager. Then he became
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer of the Oregon-
Idaho Conference of the United Methodist Church. He
brought that financial experience with him to the Ce-
dar Grove United Methodist Church, where he first be-
came pastor in July 2009. The church renewed his
contract annually in July 2010, 2011, and 2012.
Melhorn’s supervisor, Rev. Karin Walker, also assured
him orally that he could remain pastor as long as he
wanted. Melhorn received excellent evaluations as
pastor.
The financial manager in Melhorn alerted in May
2012, when the Senior Trust & Fiduciary Specialist of
Wells Fargo Bank informed Melhorn that Cedar Grove
3was a named beneficiary to a $1,224,849.34 trust. The
specific terms of the trust earmarked half that sum for
the church’s Cemetery Fund to provide upkeep of the
church’s cemetery. Melhorn knew, however, that Cedar
Grove had sold the cemetery in 2009. If his church took
the trust’s money, it could not, and would not, be used
for the cemetery’s maintenance. Worried about fraud
and possible tax evasion by Cedar Grove, Melhorn
urged church officials to discuss the terms of the trust
with Wells Fargo so that no laws would be broken. Nev-
ertheless, church officials wanted the money to go di-
rectly to the church so that they could later transfer it
to a separate and non-tax-exempt entity, Cedar Grove
Cemetery, without tax liability.
Melhorn warned members of the church’s Board of
Trustees that taking the money was likely fraud,
breach of trust, or tax evasion. Nonetheless, church of-
ficials ordered him to request the full amount of the
trust from Wells Fargo and deposit the check in the
church’s bank account. Melhorn refused; as a result,
church officials fired him despite his recent contract
renewal. Melhorn sued the church defendants for
wrongful discharge under Maryland state law.
The Baltimore County Circuit Court granted the
church defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling Melhorn’s
lawsuit was barred because he is a minister. Pet. App.
16. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed,
Pet. App. 1, and the Maryland Court of Appeals denied
certiorari. Pet. App. 30. The courts’ reasoning sug-
gested that the ministerial exception provides an abso-
lute defense to contract and tort lawsuits, with the
4result that every such lawsuit must be dismissed at
the defendants’ mention of the word minister.
The circuit court ruled that this Court’s Hosanna-
Tabor language about breach of contract and tort law-
suits "in no way changes the Maryland law up to this
point." Pet. App. 27. It then relied on Maryland’s case
law to grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss without
further inquiry into Melhorn’s allegations of resisting
participation in fraud or tax evasion. The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals relied on the same state law, citing Arch-
diocese of Washington v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659 (Md.
2007); Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28
A.3d 117 (Md. 2011); Bourne v. Ctr. on Children, Inc.,
838 A.2d 371 (Md. 2003); Bell v. Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997); and Davis v. Bal-
timore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701 (D.
Md. 2013). Melhorn, 2016 WL 1065884 at *3-5; Pet.
App. 11-13.
Yet none of those cases involved a situation like
Edwin Melhorn’s, where church authorities asked a
minister to violate laws and thus possibly cause harm
to third parties and interfere with the government’s
interests in combatting illegal conduct, tax evasion, or
fraud. The Maryland courts instead read some old
cases dismissing a few wrongful discharge lawsuits
and interpreted them to ban ministerial wrongful dis-
charge suits no matter what the surrounding circum-
stances. That approach was inconsistent with this
Court’s fact- and lawsuit-specific approach to the min-
isterial exception in Hosanna-Tabor.
5Given the confusion and conflict in the lower
courts over ministerial breach of contract and tortious
conduct cases, Petitioner requests this Court to clarify
that the First Amendment does not protect fraud, mis-
representation, or illegal acts. See, e.g., Employment
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 879 (1990) ("reject[ing] the claim that criminal
laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally
applied to those whose religion commanded the prac-
tice."); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178,
190 (1948) (the government’s power "to protect people
against fraud" has "always been recognized in this
country and is firmly established"); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (the "intentional lie" is
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v.
TelemarketingAssociates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003)
("when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally
misleading statements designed to deceive the listener,
the First Amendment leaves room for a fraud claim.");
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147,
164 (1939) ("Frauds," including "fraudulent appeals...
made in the name of charity and religion," may be "de-
nounced as offenses and punished by law."); Listecki v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731,
742 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) ("it is
unclear whether the intrachurch doctrine is even ap-
plicable where fraud is alleged").
This certiorari petition asks this Court to address
whether the ministerial exception of the First Amend-
ment absolutely bars breach of contract and tortious
6conduct lawsuits in situations of illegal conduct or
harm to third parties. This issue is confusing the state
and federal courts post-Hosanna-Tabor. Petitioner
asks this Court to grant certiorari on the question
whether the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses ab-
solutely bar ministerial breach of contract and tortious
conduct lawsuits. In the alternative, Petitioner re-
quests this Court to summarily reverse the decision
below.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
There Is a Split in Authority Whether the
Ministerial Exception Absolutely Bars
Breach of Contract and Tortious Conduct
Lawsuits.
State and federal courts disagree about the status
of breach of contract and tortious conduct cases post-
Hosanna-Tabor.
Several courts have held that ministers may sue
for breach of contract to receive pay and other employ-
ment benefits for completed services. See, e.g., Second
Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812, 813-14 (D.C. 2012) (ministerial
exception did not bar Rev. Deloris Prioleau’s lawsuit
for $39,000 "under the contract covering her final year
as pastor"); Crymes v. Grace Hope Presbyterian
Church, Inc., No. 2011-CA-000746-MR, 2012 WL
3236290, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012) ("A claim for
7unpaid wages and benefits for work previously per-
formed under an employment contract is not ecclesias-
tical and is reviewable by the court."); Bigelow v.
Sassafras Grove Baptist Church, 786 S.E.2d 358, 365
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (ministerial exception does not ap-
ply to minister’s lawsuit that "seeks to enforce a con-
tractual obligation regarding his compensation and
benefits," specifically a promise to provide payment
and disability insurance if pastor became disabled).
There is a split in authority, however, whether
breach of contract lawsuits may proceed after ministe-
rial employees are fired. The Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky allowed a minister’s lawsuit against a seminary
for breach of his tenure contract to proceed because the
employer had voluntarily agreed to the terms of the
employment contract. See Kirby v. Lexington Theologi-
cal Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 615-18 (Ky. 2014)
("[T]his is a situation in which a religious institution
has voluntarily circumscribed its own conduct, argua-
bly in the form of a contractual agreement, and now
that agreement, if found to exist, may be enforced ac-
cording to its own terms."); see also Cropper v. Saint
Augustine Sch., No. 2014-CA-001518-MR, 2016 WL
98701, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2016), reh’g denied
(Apr. 11, 2016) (Catholic school principal who was told
her position had been eliminated could pursue breach
of contract claim. "A contract claim such as the one be-
fore us is not subject to the ministerial exception.");
Jackson v. Mount Pisgah Missionary Baptist Church
Deacon Bd., 2016 IL App (1st) 143045 (pastor’s breach
of oral contract claim proceeds because "where a
8complaint alleges that a church has violated its own
bylaws, a civil court may exercise jurisdiction to decide
whether the church has violated its bylaws."). Indeed,
the Kentucky Supreme Court warned that all religious
employment contracts "would arguably be illusory,"
and schools would be unable to pursue their accredita-
tion and hiring goals, if courts refuse to enforce such
contracts. See Kirby, 426 S.W.3d at 616, n. 71.
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court dis-
missed a ministerial employee’s breach of contract law-
suit against a Roman Catholic church without
reaching a majority rationale for dismissal. The court
refused to enforce contract language requiring "good
and sufficient cause" for termination, with the lead
opinion concluding, "the First Amendment gives St.
Patrick the absolute right to terminate DeBruin for any
reason, or for no reason, as it freely exercises its reli-
gious views." DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816
N.W.2d 878, 888 (Wis. 2012) (emphasis added); see also
Warnick v. All Saints Episcopal Church, No. 01539,
Dec. Term 2011, 2014 WL 11210513, at "1 (Pa. Com. P1.
Apr. 15, 2014), aff’d, 116 A.3d 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)
(dismissing breach of contract and interference with
contract claim brought by terminated Episcopal priest
because court would "have to decide whether the
Bishop can be found liable for interfering with alleged
contracts - that is, whether he was a third party
to those contracts or whether he had to approve
those contracts himself...."); but see DeBruin v. St.
Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 905 (Wis. 2012)
9(Bradley, J., dissenting) ("DeBruin’s contract claims
are not precluded by a straightforward application of
Hosanna-Tabor.").
Justice Bradley’s dissent in DeBruin, the Wiscon-
sin case, echoed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s argu-
ments that churches may voluntarily enter into
contracts without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment. She warned; "if courts routinely dismissed this
variety of contract claim, they might create an unnec-
essary roadblock hampering a church’s free exercise
ability to select its ministers." Id. at 907; see also id.
("Candidates for ministerial positions might be less in-
clined to enter into these types of employment ar-
rangements in the first instance. A church’s ability to
recruit the best and brightest candidates for ministe-
rial positions could be undermined because the church
would be unable to offer desirable candidates any con-
tractual assurances regarding job security.").
Thus the split in authority creates the dangerous
possibility that "a church’s ability to arbitrarily fire
ministers is so sacrosanct that the church cannot con-
tract around it," even when it wants to. DeBruin, 816
N.W.2d at 907 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
The status of the ministerial exception is even
more uncertain, and the state court precedents more
split, when contract and tort claims are intertwined in
a single lawsuit, as frequently happens in employment
disputes. The New Mexico Court of Appeals allowed a
teacher at a Seventh-Day Adventist school to proceed
with a wrongful termination claim involving breach of
10
contract, retaliatory discharge, intentional interfer-
ence with contract, civil conspiracy, and defamation.
See Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 999-1000 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2014). The teacher alleged her employers had re-
taliated against her after she reported sexual harass-
ment. Instead of deciding that the ministerial
exception absolutely required dismissal of all tort and
contract claims, the New Mexico court reviewed the
specific allegations connected with each claim, con-
cluding that because all the claims could be "’resolved
by the application of purely neutral principles of law
and without impermissible government intrusion ...
there is no First Amendment shield to litigation.’" Id.
at 1001, quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 856-
57 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis, internal quotation marks,
and citations omitted). In contrast, although Peti-
tioner’s wrongful discharge case could similarly be re-
solved under neutral principles of law, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals distinguished Galetti and dis-
missed Petitioner’s wrongful discharge case as abso-
lutely barred by the ministerial exception. Melhorn,
2016 WL 1065884 at *5, Pet. App. 14.
Legal authority is also split over pure tort cases
filed by ministers. Some courts have dismissed torts
connected to entirely internal disputes about a minis-
ter’s fitness for office. See, e.g., Warnick v. All Saints
Episcopal Church, No. 01539, Dec. Term 2011, 2014
WL 11210513, at "1 (Pa. Com. P1. Apr. 15, 2014), aff’d,
116 A.3d 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (dismissing defama-
tion claim brought by terminated Episcopal priest
11
because the allegedly defamatory comments involved
his fitness for ministry). Yet other courts have warned,
"the Free Exercise Clause does not shield church peo-
ple from any secular court consideration of what hap-
pens in church meetings just because of where it
happened. If a church meeting is used as a place to
plan to commit torts involving third parties," churches
may be liable in tort. See Barrow v. Living Word
Church, No. 3:15-CV-341, 2016 WL 3976515, at *1-3
(S.D. Ohio July 25, 2016) (claim that church officials
violated pastor’s right to contract because of his race
allowed to proceed).
Some church defendants have unsuccessfully ar-
gued that Hosanna-Tabor bars third-party lawsuits
against religious organizations for the tortious conduct
of their ministerial employees. Those cases frequently
involve victims of sexual abuse suing church employ-
ers for negligent supervision of their abusers. See, e.g.,
Doe No. 2 v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,
No. HHDX07CV125036425S, 2013 WL 3871430, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013) (Hosanna-Tabor does
not preclude negligence, reckless conduct, failure to
warn, and negligent supervision claims of sexual abuse
survivor against diocese that failed to prevent sexual
abuse by a priest in its employ); Lopez v. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 4th
566, 599 (2016), review denied (July 27, 2016) ("Watch-
tower has not cited, nor are we aware of, any decisions
extending [the ministerial exception] to preclude a
third party action against a religious organization for
12
the tortious conduct of its agents."). The same princi-
ples that correctly compel those cases to be litigated
are involved in Petitioner’s case, where church officials
asked Petitioner to participate in possibly fraudulent
conduct with potential harm to third parties like the
original donors of the trust. See Listecki v. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 742 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) ("it is unclear
whether the intrachurch doctrine is even applicable
where fraud is alleged").
In the midst of such disagreements, now is the
time for this Court to clarify that the ministerial ex-
ception does not ban breach of contract or tortious con-
duct lawsuits where illegal conduct or harm to third
parties is involved.
II. Allowing Absolute Ministerial Immunity
in Cases involving Illegal Conduct or
Harm to Third Parties Establishes Danger-
ous First Amendment Precedent.
During this Court’s oral argument in Hosanna-
Tabor, Justice Sotomayor anticipated cases like Peti-
tioner’s, where important societal interests other than
the purely internal, ecclesial relationship between a
church and its ministers are at stake. The Justice
asked in particular about teachers who are fired for re-
porting sexual abuse to the government. Under the
Maryland courts’ reasoning in Petitioner’s case, such
lawsuits would be absolutely barred by the ministerial
exception. Justice Sotomayor anticipated the serious
13
problems with that outcome, asking, "Regardless of
whether it’s a religious belief or not, doesn’t society
have a right at some point to say certain conduct is un-
acceptable, even if religious ... ? And once we say
that’s unacceptable, can and why shouldn’t we protect
the people who are doing what the law requires, i.e. re-
porting it?" Transcript of Oral Argument at *5,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2011) (No. 10-553),
2011 WL 4593953 (U.S.) [hereinafter Hosanna-Tabor
Oral Arg.]; see also Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish
Cmty., Inc., 982 N.E.2d 329, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(struggling with the ministerial exception analysis in
a rabbi’s case because the "United States Supreme
Court has not determined the applicability of the min-
isterial exception where a minister’s employment was
terminated or otherwise impacted for reporting or at-
tempting to report child abuse or neglect .... ").
This Court should protect the people like Peti-
tioner who are trying to do what the law requires. This
Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment
does not protect criminal conduct or fraud. See, e.g.,
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("reject[ing] the claim
that criminal laws against polygamy could not be con-
stitutionally applied to those whose religion com-
manded the practice."); Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v.
TelemarketingAssociates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003)
("when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally
misleading statements designed to deceive the listener,
the First Amendment leaves room for a fraud claim.");
14
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147,
164 (1939) ("Frauds," including "fraudulent appeals...
made in the name of charity and religion," may be "de-
nounced as offenses and punished by law."). Moreover,
this Court has also recognized that the government’s
interest in the uniformity of its tax system is "very
high." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982).
Petitioner asks this Court to clarify that, consistent
with this Court’s interpretation of the First Amend-
ment in other doctrinal areas, the ministerial excep-
tion does not ban breach of contract and tortious
conduct lawsuits when important societal interests are
at stake.
In response to Justice Sotomayor’s important
question, even counsel for Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran
Church and School acknowledged that the ministerial
exception should not be absolute: "if you want to carve
out an exception for cases like child abuse where the
government’s interest is in protecting the child, not an
interest in protecting the minister, when you get such
a case, we think you could carve out that exception."
Hosanna-Tabor Oral Arg. at *6. Counsel then provided
the "theoretical framework" for the exception re-
quested by Justice Sotomayor:
First, you have to identify the government’s
interest in regulation. If the government’s in-
terest is in protecting ministers from discrim-
ination, we are squarely within the heart of
the ministerial exception. If the government’s
interest is something quite different from
that, like protecting the children, then you can
15
assess whether that government interest is
sufficiently compelling to justify interfering
with the relationship between the church and
its ministers. But the government’s interest is
at its nadir when the claim is we want to pro-
tect these ministers as such, we want to tell
the churches what criteria they should apply
for - for selecting and removing ministers.
Id. at "6-7. Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to
pursue that framework here, in a case that has nothing
to do with Pastor Melhorn’s qualifications for ministry
and everything to do with protecting the government’s
interests in combatting illegal conduct, tax evasion,
fraud, and possible harm to third parties associated
with the Trust, including the original donors of the
money to Cedar Grove.
Such a balanced and non-absolute approach to the
ministerial exception would be consistent with this
Court’s Religion Clause precedents, which have never
identified religious freedom rights as absolute when
important governmental and third-party interests are
at stake. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (religious accommodations must
take account of third-party interests); Lee, 455 U.S. at
261 (same); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-22
(2005) (prisoners’ demands under RLUIPA must be
weighed against the "burden a requested accommoda-
tion may impose on nonbeneficiaries" and "measured
so that [they do] not override other significant inter-
ests."); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
16
2751 (2014) (religious accommodations must consider
interests of third-party employees).
This Court has always weighed the proposed ac-
tions of First Amendment rights holders against poten-
tial harm to third parties because "[a]t some point,
accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into
’an unlawful fostering of religion’" and violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobble v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145
(1987)). Moreover, Free Exercise values are equally at
stake in recognizing that religious employers do not
enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability. The min-
isterial exception must not be interpreted inconsist-
ently with this Court’s Free Exercise precedents,
which require all citizens, even religious ones, to obey
neutral laws of general applicability. See Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990). This Court has never granted absolute First
Amendment immunity from tort liability to a church
for violation of a neutral, generally applicable law. Its
doctrine is squarely to the contrary. See Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990); Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 ("express[ing]
no view on whether the [ministerial] exception bars
other types of suits, including actions by employees alo
leging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their
religious employers.").
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Moreover, this Court has never extended absolute
immunity to religious organizations in cases that in-
volve illegal conduct or third party harm and that may
be resolved through "neutral principles of law." Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,604 (1979); see also Hosanna-Ta-
bor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. Neither should the courts of Mar-
yland or any other courts extend absolute immunity to
religious organizations. Petitioner Edwin Melhorn re-
spectfully asks this Court to clarify that his employers
do not enjoy absolute immunity for his wrongful dis-
charge.
CONCLUSION
Whether the ministerial exception of the First
Amendment absolutely bars breach of contract and tor-
tious conduct lawsuits in situations of illegal conduct
or harm to third parties is an important issue to min-
isters like Petitioner, whose lawsuit ended on a motion
to dismiss without any consideration of his duties to
obey the law and protect third parties. For this reason,
Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to grant certio-
rari in this case.
In the alternative, Petitioner requests that this
Court summarily reverse the decision below with a di-
rection that Hosanna-Tabor does not authorize abso-
lute immunity from a state’s neutral and generally
18
applicable contract and tort laws, particularly in those
situations that involve illegal conduct or possible harm
to third parties.
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